Contents

Foreword                              

Preface                             

1. Introduction              

2. Hearings from which the Public are Excluded       

3. Automatic Reporting Restrictions                     

3.1 Victims of sexual offences                               

3.2 Rulings at pre-trial hearings                             

3.3 Preparatory hearings                                      

3.4 Dismissal proceedings where there has been no committal         

3.5 Indecent material calculated to injure public morals                 

3.6 Proceedings in the absence of the jury while the trial continues    

4. Discretionary Reporting Restrictions                        

4.1 Protection of young persons and adult witnesses          

4.2 Names and other matters withheld in court              

4.3 Postponing prejudicial contemporaneous reports of proceedings      

4.4 Postponing reports of derogatory assertions made in pleas in mitigation       

5. Other Restrictions on Reporting                 

5.1 Unauthorised recording of court proceedings    

5.2 Jury’s deliberations                 

6. General Considerations             

6.1 Jigsaw identification                

Foreword

I am happy to introduce this guidance to Reporting Restrictions in the Crown Court.

As judges we are fully aware of the principles of open justice and the reasons why justice should be administered in public where both the process, and the results, are open to scrutiny. The responsibility for accurately reporting these matters to the community at large is performed by representatives of the media. Without their efforts, whatever the theory, in practice the process would become closed.

As journalists themselves readily understand, the principle is not absolute. Statutory restrictions have been imposed on the right to report specific parts of the process, and there are a number of areas where the judge has the power, in the exercise of his discretion in the interests of justice, to make similar orders. This branch of the law has not been immunised from the contemporary trend towards increased complexity which seems to characterise so many aspects of the legal process.

As a result a degree of uncertainty has developed about whether, and in what circumstances, reporting restrictions apply. More aggravating still, there seems to be no guide, readily accessible both to judges and to journalists, in which the relevant principles are collected and digested.

This guidance represents the culmination of a joint effort by representatives of the media (The Society of Editors and The Newspaper Society) and the judiciary to produce useful practical information to be made available to judges in the Crown Court and, in an identical edition, to journalists, editors and representatives of the media. Properly used, it should serve to reduce those niggling irritations that can sometimes arise through misunderstanding and uncertainty, and ensure the continuing application of the principle of open justice.

I am very grateful to Bob Satchwell of The Society of Editors and Santha Rasaiah, Head of Legal and Regulatory Affairs at The Newspaper Society, and to Lord Justice Kay for the close collaboration which has led to the preparation and distribution of the guidance, which will, I am sure, prove invaluable to everyone who uses it.

Preface

This outline of reporting restrictions relating to criminal proceedings in the Crown Court results from a joint initiative between the Senior Presiding Judge, the Judicial Studies Board, the Lord Chancellor’s Department and media organisations. It is designed to help promote greater understanding of problems in balancing the administration of justice and the need for openness in the courts to allow the media to inform the public.

There will be occasions when the principles of open justice and the right of the media to report require to be restricted in order to ensure fair trials or the protection of those who are vulnerable, such as children. The media recognises this need and their own codes of practice encourage responsible reporting to the extent of urging restraint even when the law allows publication.

A proper balance of the need for openness and conflicting considerations requires that the court should exercise the utmost care before making such an order by ensuring that it has power to make the order and that the order is necessary, being prepared to listen to representations made by the media when there is a feeling that restrictions unnecessarily interfere with open justice or make sensible reporting difficult. The court should also explain its decision clearly and ensure that the order is correctly drawn and brought to the attention of the media.

The general rule is that the administration of justice must be done in public. The media is in court to report the proceedings to the public, the majority of whom will be unable to be there in person but who have the right to be informed as to what has occurred. Accordingly, unless there is good reason, nothing should be done to prevent the publication to the wider public of fair and accurate reports of the proceedings by the media.

The open justice principle is clearly recognised by the courts and by Parliament. The common law has been supplemented in this respect by statute. The media has been given statutory rights to attend certain proceedings from which the general public is excluded; statutory defences in libel and contempt have been given to fair and accurate reports of proceedings; statutory rights have been provided to make representations against the imposition of restrictions on reporting or public access to proceedings. The role of the media is recognised in the case law under the European Convention on Human Rights.

There are circumstances in which the court will have to consider departing from this general principle. In some cases, statute automatically restricts the giving of certain details in reports of court proceedings. Common law powers and statutory restrictions enable the court in other circumstances to exclude the public and the media and to impose temporary or permanent restrictions on the media’s reports of court proceedings.

If the necessary balance between the general principle and properly competing interests is to be achieved, a clear understanding of the legal basis for the imposition of restrictions is necessary both by the judiciary and the media. This guide seeks to highlight those areas in which consideration of restrictions are likely to apply in the Crown Court in dealing with criminal cases.

In general, court proceedings must be held in open court, so that public and press have the right to attend the proceedings.

The court does have the inherent power to regulate its own proceedings. However, departure from the open justice principle is exceptional. It must be justified as necessary for the avoidance of the frustration of the administration of justice, or the rendering of it impracticable.

Statutory provisions enable the Crown Court to sit in camera and in chambers in certain circumstances.

The Crown Court Rules 1982 as amended prescribe the formal procedure for application for a trial to be held in camera, for reasons of national security or protection of the identity of a witness or another. The media may make representations and can formally appeal under s.159 Criminal Justice Act 1988.

Adjournment into Chambers should not be automatic and proceedings should be adjourned into open court as soon as exclusion of the public is unnecessary.

The Court has the discretion to exclude the public but not bona fide representatives of newspapers, broadcasters and news agencies during the testimony of witnesses aged under 18 in any proceedings relating to an offence against, or conduct contrary to decency or morality.

At common law, the court can exclude the public but retain media representatives when considering exhibits in obscene publications trials.

If the court has the power to sit in camera, it can employ less restrictive derogations from open justice which would protect the administration of justice. This might involve reporting restrictions or enabling information to be withheld from being given out in open court. However, these are also exceptional measures.

Section 25 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (when in force) permits the court to exclude persons of any description from the court during the evidence of a child or vulnerable adult witness in cases relating to a sexual offence or where there are grounds for believing that the witness has been or may be intimidated. If the media are to be excluded, one nominated representative must be permitted to remain.

Article 6 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are relevant considerations.

[Archbold 2000: 4-3 to 4-13 (Hearings in Open Court); 25-319, 25-321, 25-337 (Official Secrets Act);

1-230, 2-153, 2-158 (Hearings in Chambers);

4-239 (Challenge to juror for cause); 8-55n (s.25 Youth Justice & Criminal Evidence Act 1999); 25-321; 25-337; 28-56 (Publication of matters relating to proceedings in private)]

There are a number of automatic reporting restrictions on proceedings held in open court. The existence of an automatic restriction may render some discretionary restrictions unnecessary, (e.g. there is no need to make a discretionary order in respect of a child victim of a sexual offence because the automatic restrictions as to the identity of any victim of a sexual offence apply). It may be of assistance in some cases for the judge to remind the media of any automatic restriction and to consider whether any guidance will assist the media to keep within such automatic restrictions. The statutory provisions may give the court power to lift or vary the restrictions in specified circumstances on its own motion or after hearing application from the parties or media.

Once Schedule 2 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is brought into force, all restrictions on reporting matters relating to the identity of complainants in sexual offences will be contained in the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 as amended¹.

The 1992 Act as amended imposes a lifetime ban on reporting the identity of the alleged victim once an allegation that an offence has been committed is made and this continues after someone has been charged.

The offences to which this automatic restriction applies are set out in section 2 of the 1992 Act and include rape, indecent assault, indecency with children and the vast majority of other sexual offences [Archbold 2000: 20-267].

Since the restriction is mandatory no order of the court is required even in the case of a child victim.

A person charged with a sexual offence covered by the restriction may apply to the court to direct that the restriction shall not apply if such a direction is required to induce potential witnesses to come forward and the conduct of the defence is likely to be substantially prejudiced if no such direction is given.

The trial judge has the discretion to lift or relax the reporting restrictions if their effect is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on reporting the proceedings at trial and it would be in the public interest to do so.

The victim or alleged victim may in writing agree to the restriction being lifted.

[Archbold 2000: 20-266 to 20-270]

Automatic restrictions under section 41 and 42 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 prevent reporting of all rulings made at pre-trial hearings together with orders for discharge and variation of such rulings and application proceedings for rulings and orders.

The restrictions apply until the trial of all defendants in the case has concluded. However, the restrictions can be lifted in whole or in part, provided that the court is satisfied, after hearing the representations of all the accused where any of them object, that it is in the interests of justice to do so.

[Archbold 2000: 4-84q]

Reporting restrictions are imposed in respect of preparatory hearings. Section 37 and 38 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 provide for restrictions where the case is a long or complex one and section 11 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 makes provision in cases of serious fraud.

The Crown Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords can lift the restrictions in whole or in part, although, if any of the accused object, the court has to be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so after hearing the representations of each accused. If the restrictions are lifted, the ban continues to apply to the accused’s objections to and representations against their lifting. Otherwise, the restrictions end on conclusion of the trial of the accused or the last of the accused to be tried.

Until then, in Great Britain newspapers, periodicals, and broadcasters can only publish or include one or more of the following matters in their reports of the proceedings: the identity of the court and the name of the judge; the names, ages, home addresses and occupations of the accused and witnesses; the offence or offences with which the accused is or are charged or a summary of them; the names of counsel and solicitors in the proceedings; where the proceedings are adjourned, the date and place to which they are adjourned; any arrangements as to bail; whether legal aid was granted to the accused or any of the accused. In serious fraud cases, relevant business information may also be given including the name and address of any business which the accused was carrying on, on his own account; name and address of any firm of which he was a partner or by which he was engaged; name, registered or principal office, or working address of the accused, of any company of which he was a director, or by which he was otherwise engaged at the relevant time.

The addresses that may be published or included in a relevant programme are addresses at any relevant time, and at the time of their publication or inclusion in a relevant programme; ‘relevant time’ here means a time when events giving rise to the charges to which the proceedings relate occurred.

[Archbold 2000: 4-84k (long and complex cases); 2-139 (serious fraud)]

Similar restrictions apply to unsuccessful applications for dismissal in cases for trial in the Crown Court where there has been no committal proceeding. These cover serious fraud cases (s. 11 Criminal Justice Act 1987); charges alleging sexual offences or offences involving violence or cruelty against children (s. 53; Sched. 6 para.6 Criminal Justice Act 1991); and indictable only cases automatically sent for trial (Sched. 3 paragraph 3 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998).

[Archbold 2000: 2-139 (serious fraud); 2-145 (offences against children); 1-12h (indictable only offences)]

Section 1 (l)(a) of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926 prohibits the publication in relation to any judicial proceedings of any indecent matter or indecent medical, surgical or physiological details which would be calculated to injure public morals.

At common law, it is a contempt of court to publish any material which interferes with the course of justice as a continuing process in criminal proceedings. The reporting of that which transpires at times when the jury are asked to withdraw, at any stage before the jury returns its verdict, is therefore likely to be a contempt of court since the report may well defeat the whole purpose of the jury withdrawing.

[Archbold 2000: 28-59]

The Crown Court has power in appropriate cases to impose temporary or permanent restrictions on the media’s reports. In general, the authorities stress the paramount importance of the open justice principle, the exceptional nature of any restrictions and the criteria safeguarding that principle which must be satisfied before any such reporting restriction can be imposed.

Courts may need to consider the interaction of statutory provisions with common law powers and Articles 6 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (when in force) provides for revised restrictions² on the reporting of the identity of young persons involved in criminal proceedings and a new power to restrict reporting in respect of certain adult witnesses.

(i) Persons Under the age of 18

a) Pre-commencement of criminal proceedings

Section 44 of the 1999 Act (if brought into force in full) would automatically prevent reporting of any matter which might lead the public to identify a person under 18 as a potential defendant, victim or witness as soon as a criminal investigation has begun.

This restriction lasts only until criminal proceedings begin.

Any criminal court may dispense with the restrictions to any extent that it specifies if satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. There is a right of appeal from a magistrates court’s decision in this regard to the Crown Court.

It should be noted that the Home Office has made clear that it has no current intention to implement these provisions in respect of the identification of young witnesses and victims.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29a]

b) Proceedings in the Crown Court

Section 45 of the 1999 Act gives a power to the court to give a direction restricting reporting of any matter which might lead the public to identify a person under 18 as a defendant, victim or witness in criminal proceedings.

In contrast to the investigation stage, this power is not automatic but at the discretion of the court. The power should not be exercised as a matter of routine but the court should balance the general requirement for open justice with the need to protect young people involved in the proceedings.

The court is required by subsection 6 to have regard to the welfare of the young person.

The restriction can only be made under this section until the person reaches the age of 18.

The court may at the time of giving a reporting restriction direction, or subsequently qualify the direction to any extent by ‘an excepting direction’ if either it is necessary in the interests of justice, or the effect of the direction is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of proceedings and it is in the public interest to remove or relax the restriction. [The public interest element is dealt with below at (iii)]

An excepting direction cannot be given by reason of the fact that the proceedings have been determined in any particular way or have been abandoned. However, in the case of a defendant the fact that he has been convicted and that there is to be an appeal with some prospect of success which may result in a retrial may be a basis for making an excepting direction until the proposed appeal is disposed of when the judge might otherwise have considered revoking the original direction. The Divisional Court has made clear that the possibility of a retrial is ‘a matter of very great importance in considering revoking directions in such circumstances’³.

There is no power to impose restrictions to prevent identification of children other than the defendant, a victim or a witness, e.g. the siblings of the defendant or a victim.

Under the old legislation, it was held that there was no power to make an order to prevent identification of a deceased child. This would appear to apply equally under the new law.

In a number of cases at first instance, the court has considered that it is a very relevant consideration that a child victim was a baby or very young so that any adverse publicity was likely to have been a thing of the past before the child would even be aware of it.

Guidance under the old law as to whether a reporting restriction prohibiting a young defendant from being identified should be lifted where an appeal is proposed was given by the Court of Appeal in R v Manchester Crown Court ex parte H and D [2000] 1 Cr. App. R. 262.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29b also 4-27 to 4-28 (decisions under earlier legislation)]

(ii) Adult Witnesses

Section 46 of the 1999 Act gives the court power to restrict reporting about certain adult witnesses (other than the accused) in criminal proceedings on the application of any party during the lifetime of the witness.

An adult witness is eligible for protection if the quality of his evidence or his co-operation with the preparation of the case is likely to be diminished by reason of fear or distress in connection with identification by the public as a witness.

The court may make a reporting restriction direction in respect of such a person if the making of such an order is likely to improve the quality of the evidence of the witness or his co-operation in the preparation.

The court must have regard to:

• The nature and circumstances of the offence;
• The age of the witness;
• The social and cultural background of the witness and his ethnic origin, if relevant;
• The domestic and employment circumstances of the witness, if relevant;
• Any religious beliefs or political opinions of the witness, if relevant;
• Any behaviour towards the witness by the defendant, his family or associates or other witnesses and defendants;
• Any views expressed by the witness.

The court must also consider whether the making of a reporting direction would be in the interests of justice and consider the public interest in avoiding the imposition of a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of proceedings.

Strangely it does not seem possible to give a reporting restriction order in respect of a witness under 18 that will last beyond his 18th birthday even in a case where the court would make a lifetime direction in relation to an adult.

Excepting directions can be given and the directions may be revoked or varied at any stage either by the court or an appellate court, under similar provisions relating to those under 18. (See above).

[Archbold 2000: 4-29c]

(iii) General considerations in relation to persons under 18 & adult witnesses

Breach of reporting directions is a summary offence under section 49 of the 1999 Act. Prosecution requires the consent of the Attorney General. A statutory defence is provided under section 50(1) that the person charged was not aware, and neither suspected nor had reason to suspect, that the publication included the matter or report in question. Section 50(7) contains a defence of the witness’s consent when the restriction applies to an adult witness⁴.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29e]

A restriction direction prevents publication of any matter leading to identification but specifically name and address, any school or educational establishment attended, place of work and photographs (still or moving) if they are likely to lead members of the public to identify the person as having been involved in the offence.

In determining whether something is in the public interest, the court must have regard to the open reporting of crime, the open reporting of matters relating to human health or safety and the prevention and exposure of miscarriages of justice as well as to the welfare of the person in relation to whom the restriction would apply and views such a person, or in the case of a person under 16 his parent or other appropriate person, may have expressed.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29f]

The provisions of sections 45 and 46 of the Act do not apply to proceedings commenced before the coming into force of the sections.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29i]

Section 47 of the 1999 Act prohibits the reporting of special measures directions under section 19 and directions which prohibit the accused from conducting cross-examination. The automatic ban applies during the trial, but the court may order that the restrictions do not apply in whole or in part.

[Archbold 2000: 4-29d]

Under section 11 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, in any case where a court (having the power to do so) allows a name or other matter to be withheld from the public in proceedings before it, it may give such directions prohibiting the publication of the name or other matter in connection with the proceedings, as appear to be necessary for the purpose for which it was withheld.

The court must have, at common law, the power to depart from the open justice principle. For example, it cannot make a section 11 order to prohibit publication of material previously given out in open court in those proceedings. Applications for section 11 orders may therefore be heard in camera.

The Court of Appeal and Divisional Court have considered a range of cases where orders prohibiting identification or publication of identifying details, such as an address, have been sought in respect of defendants, witnesses, including victims, and claimants. Consistent with the general requirement of open justice, the Court’s prime consideration should be the administration of justice and whether it is satisfied that failure to make an order would frustrate or impede it.

The Court has the discretion to hear representations from the media or their legal representatives as to the making, variation or lifting of a section 11 order. The media may appeal formally against a Crown Court order to the Court of Appeal under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The order should be committed to writing by the Crown Court judge personally or by the clerk to the court under his direction and a permanent record kept. It should state its precise scope, the time at which it will cease to have effect, if appropriate, and the specific purpose in making the order. The press should be given notice that an order has been made and court staff should be prepared to answer any inquiry about a specific case (see Practice Direction (Contempt: Reporting Restrictions) [1982]1 WLR 1475). Court Business Rules also suggest prominent display of the notice and insertion into the Daily list.

Where material might be withheld from the public, it is possible to use other means which represent a lesser derogation from the open justice principle e.g. postponement orders under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 if the relevant requirements are satisfied. The court has the power to permit some evidence to be submitted in writing rather than read aloud (e.g. medical reports submitted for sentencing consideration).

Lord Bingham C.J. has given guidance that addresses of witnesses, whether for the prosecution or the defence, should only be given in open court with the leave of the court where the address is necessary for evidential purposes.

[Archbold 2000: 8-71a, 28-80, 28-96, 28-98]

Under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the Crown Court has power in certain restricted circumstances to order that publication of reports of part or all of the proceedings held in open court be postponed for so long as necessary, where such a postponement is necessary for avoiding a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in those or other proceedings.

Under section 4(2), Courts should consider whether publication would create a substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and whether postponement of publication of a fair and accurate report of part or the whole of the proceedings which have been held in open court is necessary to avoid that risk. The court should only exercise its discretion to make an order after weighing the competing interests of open justice and fair trial.

The courts have suggested that where possible the question of any imposition of reporting restrictions are best dealt with in advance of trial. The Crown Court has discretion to invite representations from the media or their legal representatives as to whether an order should be made, varied or lifted. It may make a temporary order to restrict publication pending its hearing to determine whether an order should be made. The media has the formal right to appeal against the Crown Court’s imposition of an order under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The Practice Direction (Contempt of Court Act 1981)⁵ requires that the order must be committed to writing either by the judge or by the clerk under his supervision. It must be formulated in precise terms and must state (a) its precise scope, (b) the time at which it shall cease to have effect, if appropriate, and (c) the specific purpose of making the order.

It may be appropriate for the judge to make clear whether and to what extent the terms of the order can be published.

[Archbold 2000: 28-77 to 28-83]

Section 58 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 gives a Crown Court determining sentence following conviction or on appeal against a sentence imposed by the magistrates power to postpone reporting of derogatory assertions about a named or identified person, if believed on substantial grounds to be false or irrelevant, newly made in mitigation and sentencing appeals and reviews. The section does not apply if the assertions have previously been made during the trial or at other proceedings relating to the offence.

An interim order can be made as soon as the assertion has been made. A final order must be made as soon as reasonably practicable after the sentence is passed and can last for 12 months.

The Court can revoke orders of its own motion, or after application. Home Office Circular 24/3/1997 suggests that the media and other third parties can make applications, perhaps by written submission. The media can formally appeal against an interim or final order made by the Crown Court, under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.

The Home Office Circular gives guidance to court staff on the prompt notification of the media when an order has been made, the display and content of notices on court premises and availability of more detailed information, the entry into the court record of the dates on which the order commences and ceases to have effect, its statutory basis, whether interim or final, names of the defendant and the third party protected, and the derogatory assertions.

[Archbold 2000: 4-30b]

The court has the discretion to permit tape recordings, which would otherwise constitute contempt. (Contempt of Court Act 1981, section 9, Practice Direction (Tape Recorders) [1981] 1 WLR 1526). It is an offence to take photographs or make sketches or attempt to do so in court, in respect of the judge, witness or party if in the court room, court building or court precincts. (Criminal Justice Act 1925 section 41) The court can issue guidance on the extent of the precincts of the court buildings e.g. by way of a map.

[Archbold 2000: 28-92 (tape recorders); 4-30 (photographs etc.)]

It is a contempt of court to publish a report of a jury’s deliberations (Contempt of Court Act 1981 section 8).

[Archbold 2000: 28-90 et seq.]

In some instances referred to above there is a requirement that a restriction order should be committed to writing by the judge personally or by the clerk under his supervision. Good practice should require that this is done whenever a discretionary order is made to ensure that the written order is in the precise form required by the judge.

There will be cases where the court will be assisted before making an order by receiving either written or oral representations from the media. Factors known to the media may not be apparent from the papers and neither the prosecution nor the defence may be aware of them or have any particular interest in advancing them. It is sensible always to consider inviting such representations. This practice was encouraged by the Divisional Court in R v Teesdale and Wear Valley Justices ex parte M (7 February 2000).

When a discretionary restriction order is made, it is clearly desirable that the media are given every assistance to comply with it. A judge may, therefore, think it helpful to say that if there are any particular problems arising from the making of the order which the media wish to raise in a written note, further guidance will be given in open court.

Every court should have a proper procedure for ensuring that adequate steps are taken to draw any discretionary restriction order to the attention of media representatives who may not have been in court when the order was made and a judge should ensure that the procedure has been followed.

Particular problems may arise where an order restricts publication of the identity of a victim or witness, and different reports, each complying with the requirement not to identify the victim or witness provide information which when put together makes the restricted identification clear. For example, if one report refers to an unnamed defendant having been convicted of rape of his daughter, and another report names the defendant but does not identify the relationship between the defendant and the witness. However, newspapers, magazines, broadcasters and their regulators have aligned their respective codes so that the media adopt a common approach which avoids such problems when reporting sexual offences (see Code of Practice upheld by the Press Complaints Commission, BBC Producers Guidelines, Independent Television Commission Programme Code, Radio Authority Programme Code). Media organisations may also agree to follow the same approach in reporting other offences involving children. This enables identification of the defendant by name but requires that no details should be given of any relationship which would link the offence to the alleged victim or otherwise identify the victim or the witness. It is recognised that this restriction may handicap the reporting of proceedings but the uniform approach protects the victim or the witness in the way required by the court. Since reports may already have appeared before the case reaches the Crown Court, the court should be very slow to interfere with this agreed practice (even where interference is possible - see R v Southwark Crown Court ex p. Godwin [1991] 3 All ER 818) since it may result in the sort of identification that the agreement is designed to prevent.

Article 6 (right to a fair hearing), article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and article 10 (right to freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights may need to be considered. Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 making provision for protection of journalistic and literary material against prior restraint does not apply to criminal proceedings.

[Archbold 2000: 16-57 (Art. 6); 16-101 (Art. 8); 16-101 (Art. 10)]

1 The law before the 1999 Act can be found in Archbold 2000: 20-7 to 20-10 and 20-266 to 20-270.

2 The discretionary restrictions in respect of children and young persons involved in Crown Court proceedings before the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 comes into force are contained in section 39 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (which will apply solely to civil proceedings when the 1999 Act is implemented). These are fully considered at Archbold 2000: 4-27 to 4-28.

3 R v Manchester Crown Court ex parte H & D (unreported - 30 July 1999) - a decision relating to the earlier legislation

4 When the restriction has been imposed under section 44 (under 18 year olds before commencement of proceedings in a court), then defences are provided under section 50(2), (3) and (5).

5 76 Cr App R 78, [1982] 1 WLR 1475.